We consider several related set extensions of the core and the anticore of games with transferable utility. An efficient allocation is undominated if it cannot be improved, in a specific way, by sidepayments changing the allocation or the game. The set of all such allocations is called the undominated set, and we show that it consists of finitely many polytopes with a core-like structure. One of these polytopes is the L1-center, consisting of all efficient allocations that minimize the sum of the absolute values of the excesses. The excess Pareto optimal set contains the allocations that are Pareto optimal in the set obtained by ordering the sums of the absolute values of the excesses of coalitions and the absolute values of the excesses of their complements. The L1-center is contained in the excess Pareto optimal set, which in turn is contained in the undominated set. For three-person games all these sets coincide. These three sets also coincide with the core for balanced games and with the anticore for antibalanced games. We study properties of these sets and provide characterizations in terms of balanced collections of coalitions. We also propose a singlevalued selection from the excess Pareto optimal set, the min-prenucleolus, which is defined as the prenucleolus of the minimum of a game and its dual.
Introduction
The core of a game with transferable utility can be interpreted from a strategic point of view -a coalition may 'deviate' from the grand coalition if it obtains less than its stand-alone worth -but also from a fairness point of view: if one coalition obtains its worth or more, then it is only fair that all coalitions obtain at least their worths. From the fairness point of view, a natural extension of the core for games in which the core is empty, would be the anticore, provided that this is a nonempty set. The anticore is the set of efficient allocations where every coalition obtains at most its worth, and the fairness argument now says that, if one coalition obtains its worth or less, then it is only fair that all coalitions obtain at most their worths. In general, however, both the core and the anticore of a game may be empty, and then the question is what a 'natural' extension of the core or the anticore for such games could be.
Of course, this question is not new. A classical extension of the core is the ε-core, based on subtracting ε from the coalitional worths, and the least core, i.e., the intersection of all nonempty ε-cores (Shapley and Shubik, 1966; Maschler et al, 1979) . Recently, Bejan and Gómez (2009) propose, alternatively, to increase the worth of the grand coalition to obtain a nonempty core, where this increase is financed by taxing individual players. The resulting solution concept is called the extended core. All such extensions have in common that, essentially, the core restrictions are relaxed in order to obtain a nonempty solution. Our approach is quite different, and there are no obvious relations between the mentioned extensions (least core, extended core) and our extensions.
We start by defining undominated efficient allocations. An efficient allocation x is undominated in a game v if there is no other efficient allocation z and no game w arising from sidepayments between players (i.e., by adding an additive game to v) such that for each coalition S the minimum of z(S) (its total payoff from z) and w(S) is at least as large as, and sometimes strictly larger than, the minimum of x(S) and v(S); the allocation z and the game w are interpreted as arising from bargaining over x and v, respectively, and considering the minimum is based on an assumption of (pessimistic) max-min preferences concerning uncertainty of reaching a final agreement (x or z) or not (v or w) . The set of all undominated efficient allocations is called the undominated set, and we show, indeed, that for balanced games this set coincides with the core and for antibalanced games with the anticore. We characterize the undominated set by balancedness conditions. These conditions imply that being undominated is equivalent to the impossibility of redistributing the payoffs among all coalitions with nonpositive excesses such that no coalition with negative excess loses, and redistributing the payoffs among all coalitions with nonnegative excesses such that no coalition with positive excess loses. In fact, this characterization can serve as an intuitive alternative definition, and in a specific sense reflects the fairness consideration discussed earlier.
We propose two other set extensions of the core and the anticore. The L 1 -center, first introduced in Spinetto (1974) , consists of all efficient allocations that minimize the sum of the absolute values of the coalitional excesses. The excess Pareto optimal set consists of all efficient allocations that are associated with Pareto optimal points (with the understanding that lower values are better) of the set of vectors arising from computing, for each coalition, the sum of the absolute value of its excess and the absolute value of the excess of its complement, over all possible efficient allocations. The L 1 -center is contained in the excess Pareto optimal set, which in turn is contained in the undominated set. The latter two coincide on the interesting class of proper games (i.e., games in which the worth of a coalition plus the worth of its complement is never larger than the worth of the grand coalition). All three sets coincide with the core for balanced games and the anticore for antibalanced games. They also coincide for all three-person games. The undominated set is the union of a finite collection of polytopes, each with a core-like structure. The L 1 -center is exactly one of these polytopes, and the excess Pareto optimal set is the union of a specific subcollection of these polytopes.
Besides studying further properties of these three set extensions we also propose a single-valued solution which selects from the excess Pareto optimal set and thus from the undominated set. This solution is a modification of the prenucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) , called the min-prenucleolus, and it assigns to a game the prenucleolus of the coalition-wise minimum of that game and its dual. We present an axiomatic characterization, based on the characterization of the prenucleolus of Sobolev (1975) .
The paper is organized as follows. After preliminaries in Section 2 we introduce the undominated set in Section 3, and characterize it by balanced collections and relate it to the core and the anticore in Section 4. The L 1 -center and the excess Pareto optimal set are discussed in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. In Section 7 we show that the excess Pareto optimal set is contractible. Section 8 is devoted to the min-prenucleolus and its characterization, while Section 9 briefly reconsiders the undominated set for proper games. Section 10 concludes.
Preliminaries
A game with transferable utility or, simply, a game is a pair (N, v) , where N = {1, . . . , n} with n ∈ N is the set of players and the function v : 2 N → R with v(∅) = 0 is the characteristic function, assigning to each coalition S ⊆ N its worth v(S). We also call (N, v) an n-person game and often write v instead of (N, v) if there is no confusion about the player set. We sometimes write ijk . . . for a coalition {i, j, k, . . .} ⊆ N .
An (n-person) allocation is a vector x ∈ R N . For an allocation x and a coalition S ⊆ N we denote x(S) := i∈S x i , with the convention x(∅) := 0. An allocation x is efficient in the game v if x(N ) = v(N ). The set of efficient allocations in v is denoted by X(v).
Note that such a game is completely described by the worths of the singleton coalitions. In particular, any allocation x can be identified with an additive game v x by letting v x ({i}) = x i for all i ∈ N ; in this case we usually write x instead of v x . The sum v + w of two games v and w is defined by (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S) for all S ∈ 2 N . In particular, for x ∈ R N , v + x is the sum of v and the additive game induced by x.
A collection of coalitions B ⊆ 2 N is balanced if there are positive numbers λ(S), S ∈ B, such that S∈B: i∈S λ(S) = 1 for every i ∈ N . The numbers λ(S) are called balancing weights.
A sidepayment for the player set N is a vector y ∈ R N with y(N ) = 0. N ) for every balanced collection B, with balancing weights λ(S). Clearly, an additive game is both balanced and antibalanced, but any other game is either balanced or antibalanced or none of the two. The core C(v) of a game v is the set {x ∈ X(v) | x(S) v(S) for all S ∈ 2 N } and the anticore AC(v) is the set {x ∈ X(v) | x(S) v(S) for all S ∈ 2 N }. It is well-known (Bondareva, 1962; Shapley, 1967 ) that C(v) = ∅ if and only if v is balanced, and similarly that AC(v) = ∅ if and only if v is antibalanced.
Sidepayments and balanced collections can be related as follows. For B ⊆ B ⊆ 2 N , we say that B is balanced within B if there exists a balanced collection B with B ⊆ B ⊆ B . Then we have the following useful result.
Lemma 2.1 A collection B is balanced within a collection B if and only if for each sidepayment y ∈ R N with y(S) 0 for all S ∈ B we have y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ B. In particular, a collection B is balanced if and only if for each sidepayment y ∈ R N with y(S) 0 for all S ∈ B we have y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ B.
A proof of this lemma, based on Farkas' Lemma, can be found in Derks and Peters (1998) .
The undominated set
Our definition of the undominated set of a game v will be based on a new concept of domination among efficient allocations. In order to motivate this new concept, consider a game v and an efficient allocation x ∈ X(v). Assume that the proposal x is on the table, and consider a coalition S. From the point of view of S, if the final decision is exclusively about x, then S is going to obtain x(S) if an agreement on x is reached, and v(S) otherwise, hence S is sure to obtain the minimum of x(S) and v(S). This reflects a coalition having max-min preferences over the uncertain issue of reaching agreement or not. However, consider the following two possibilities before the actual agreement or disagreement decision on a proposal is taken. First, x may be replaced by another efficient allocation z ∈ X(v); equivalently, x is replaced by x + y, where y is a sidepayment. Second, players may make prepayments among each other, effectively turning the game v into a new game v + y , where y is the additive game induced by these prepayments, i.e., y is again a sidepayment. After such a bargaining phase, from the point of view of coalition S, if an agreement will be reached then S is going to obtain (x + y)(S), and otherwise it is going to obtain (v + y )(S); hence, S is sure to obtain the minimum of (x + y)(S) and (v + y )(S).
With this setting in mind, we present the following definition.
Definition 3.1 Let v be a game and let x ∈ X(v). Then x is dominated if there are sidepayments y and y such that min{(x + y)(S), (v + y )(S)} min{x(S), v(S)} for all S ∈ 2 N with at least one of these inequalities strict. If x is not dominated, then it is undominated. The set of all undominated effcient allocations is the undominated set, denoted by UD(v).
Thus, if x ∈ X(v) is undominated, then there are no sidepayments y, y such that all coalitions are better off and at least one coalition is strictly better off by deciding on the allocation x + y instead of x and at the same time performing sidepayments y . Observe, again, that 'better off' is based, implicitly, on the coalitions having max-min preferences to deal with the uncertainty of the players reaching an agreement on a proposal.
Remark 3.2 This concept of domination is closely related to the dominance relation between pairs of allocations considered in Bossert, Derks and Peters (2005) in the context of uncertain cooperative games.
Characterization of the undominated set by balanced collections
The undominated set can be characterized in terms of balanced collections. This yields a finite check on (un)dominatedness of an efficient allocation, and is convenient for computational purposes. Moreover, the characterization provides relations with the core and the anticore of a game. More generally, it is useful for investigating the geometric structure of the undominated set. Specifically, we will show that the undominated set is a union of finitely many polytopes. We start with an auxiliary lemma on extending balanced collections.
Lemma 4.1 Let B 1 and B 2 be balanced collections in 2 N . Then there are balanced collections C 1 and C 2 such that
Thus, S or S and N \ S can be added to B 1 or B 2 . The desired sets C 1 and C 2 are obtained by repeating this argument.
In order to state the characterization theorem, for a game v and an efficient allocation x ∈ X(v) we define the following collections of coalitions:
When there is no confusion about what the game is, we often write L(x), E(x), and H(x) instead of L(x, v), E(x, v), and H(x, v). Proof. For the only-if part, let x be undominated. We show that L(x) is balanced within L(x) ∪ E(x). Suppose not, then according to Lemma 2.1 there is a sidepayment y with y(S) 0 for all S ∈ L(x) ∪ E(x) and y(S) > 0 for some
with at least one inequality strict, as is easy to verify. This violates undominatedness of x. Hence L(x) is balanced within L(x) ∪ E(x). Similarly, one shows that H(x) is balanced within H(x) ∪ E(x). So we have shown that there are balanced collections B 1 and B 2 with L(
For the if-part, let B 1 and B 2 be as in the statement of the theorem. In view of Lemma 4.1 we may assume that B 1 ∪ B 2 = 2 N . Suppose there are sidepayments y and y such that
, which in turn implies y(S) 0. Since B 1 is balanced it is also balanced within L(x) ∪ E(x), which by Lemma 2.1 implies y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ B 1 . Similarly, one shows that y (S) = 0 for all S ∈ B 2 . Since B 1 ∪ B 2 = 2 N , it follows that all inequalities in (1) are equalities, so that x is undominated.
The following corollary follows from Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 4.1. Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 4.2 (or Corollary 4.3) provide a further explanation of undominated allocations and, indeed, could be used as alternative definitions. Define the excess of a coalition S in a game v at an efficient allocation x by e(S, x, v) = e(S, x) = v(S) − x(S). Then an efficient allocation is undominated exactly if by any sidepayment (redistribution) that makes no coalition with nonpositive excess worse off no coalition with negative excess can strictly improve, and by any sidepayment that makes no coalition with nonnegative excess worse off no coalition with positive excess can strictly improve.
As an illustration, in the next example we compute the undominated set for three-person symmetric games (already considered in von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).
Example 4.4 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, let α ∈ R N , and consider the three-person symmetric game v with v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N , v(ij) = α for all i, j ∈ N with i = j, and v(N ) = 1. For α 2 3 we have
3 | x(N ) = 1 and x i 0 for all i ∈ N }. All these statements can be checked by using Theorem 4.2 or Corollary 4.3.
The next result shows that the undominated set extends the core and the anticore.
Proof. Suppose that C(v) = ∅, and let z ∈ C(v). Since E(z) ∪ H(z) = 2 N and 2 N is balanced, Theorem 4.2 implies that z is undominated, so C(v) ⊆ UD(v). To prove the converse inclusion, letx be an arbitrary element of C(v). Then for every S ∈ 2 N and every x ∈ X(v) we have min{x(S) (v) . This proves the first implication in the theorem. The proof of the second implication is analogous
1 .
The following example shows that in general the undominated set does not have to be convex. Then x = (−2, −2, 2, 2) ∈ UD(v) (check the balancedness conditions in Theorem 4.2) and so is y = −x. However,
L(0) = {12, 23, 34, 14, 4}, which cannot be extended to a balanced collection by adding elements from E(0). So UD(v) is not convex.
We now further explore the relation between the undominated set, the core and the anticore. For a game v and an arbitrary collection B ⊆ 2 N define the B-restricted core and anticore by
Let P = P N denote the set of all pairs of balanced collections with player set N such that all coalitions are used, i.e.,
An element of P is called a constellation.
We now have:
Theorem 4.7 Let v be a game. Then
Proof. If x ∈ UD(v) then by Corollary 4.3 there are balanced collections B 1 and
with both collections balanced, so x ∈ UD(v) by Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.7 says that the undominated set is the union of finitely many polyhedra, each one with a core-like structure. We can actually say more.
Lemma 4.8 Let v be a game and let
Proof. Closedness is obvious. Suppose the set were not bounded. Then there must be a player i ∈ N such that, for every number
, are balancing weights associated with B 2 . By choosing x ∈ AC(B 1 , v) ∩ C(B 2 , v) with x({i}) = x i large enough, there must be a coalition T ∈ B 2 with x(T ) < v(T ), contradicting the fact that x ∈ C(B 2 , v). Hence the set
Lemma 4.8 and Theorem 4.7 imply that the undominated set is the union of finitely many polytopes. In particular, we have the following consequence.
Corollary 4.9 For every game v the set UD(v) is compact.
Many of the polytopes in Theorem 4.7 can be empty. For instance, if v is a balanced game, then for the only nonempty polytope, the core, we can take the constellation P = (B 1 , B 2 ) where
, as follows from Theorem 4.5. Nonemptiness of the undominated set for arbitrary v will follow as a result in the next section (Corollary 5.4).
In general, different pairs (B 1 , B 2 ) ∈ P may lead to the same set AC(B 1 , v) ∩ C(B 2 , v). In order to achieve a canonical representation, call (B 1 , B 2 ) ∈ P maximal with respect to the game v if there exists an
The following lemma shows that we indeed obtain a canonical, 'unique' representation of UD(v) based on maximal constellations.
Lemma 4.10 Let v be a game and let P m v denote the set of maximal constellations with respect to v. Then
and
Proof. Clearly, an allocation x as in (2) for a maximal constellation does not belong to the polytope of any other maximal constellation with respect to v. Together with Theorem 4.7 this implies (4). Also one inclusion of (3) follows from Theorem 4.7. In order to show the other inclusion let z ∈ UD(v) and take (B 1 , B 2 ) ∈ P such that z ∈ P := AC(B 1 , v) ∩ C(B 2 , v). Define the sets L, E, and H by
, so it is sufficient to prove that B 1 and B 2 are balanced. Consider a sidepayment y ∈ R N with y(S) 0 for all S ∈ B 1 = L ∪ E. We may assume that (x + y)(S) > v(S) for all S ∈ H. Since L ⊆ B 1 ⊆ L ∪ E and B 1 is balanced, we have y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ B 1 by Lemma 2.1. Then we must have y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ E as well, since otherwisex + y would be an element of P with (x + y)(S) > v(S) for some S ∈ E, contradicting the definition of E. Hence, y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ L ∪ E, implying balancedness of B 1 = L ∪ E by Lemma 2.1. One similarly proves that B 2 is balanced.
Remark 4.11 Lemma 4.10 says that the undominated set of a game v consists of a collection of distinct polytopes which correspond one-to-one with the maximal constellations with respect to v. The proof of the lemma in fact shows that any nonempty polytope generated by some arbitrary possibly nonmaximal constellation is equal to one of these polytopes.
Note, further, that if (B 1 , B 2 ) ∈ P is maximal with respect to v then the dimension of the set AC(B 1 , v) ∩ C(B 2 , v) -i.e., the dimension of the smallest affine subspace of R n containing it -is equal to n−|B 1 ∩B 2 |+1, hence maximally n − 1.
2
We denote the relative interior of a set Z ⊆ R n -i.e., the interior of Z relative to a smallest affine subspace of R n containing Z -by relint(Z). Now we have:
Lemma 4.12 Let the constellation (B 1 , B 2 ) ∈ P be maximal with respect to the game v. Then for every
The last claim in the lemma is obvious.
In a game v, the sets L(x) ∪ E(x) and H(x) ∪ E(x) for an undominated allocation x ∈ X(v) are not necessarily balanced themselves. Lemmas 4.10 and 4.12 however imply that these sets are balanced if x is a relative interior allocation of the polytope to which it belongs. Hence, such allocations are elements of the set sUD(v) defined by
Thus we have
Since for every (B 1 , B 2 ) ∈ P the set AC(
, it follows that the set at the left-hand side in (5) and thus also the set sUD(v) is dense in UD(v). The following example shows that both inclusions can be strict.
) = v(1) = −1 and v(S) = 0 for all other S ⊆ N . Then the undominated set is the convex hull of the set {(0, 0, 0), (−1, 0, 1), (−1, 1, 0), (0, 1, −1)}. For (v) ). This example may be extended to more than three players by adding null-players.
Remark 4.14 Yanovskaya (2002) introduces the 'extended prenucleolus' of a game v, which we denote by Y (v). Theorem 1 in Yanovskaya (1998) states that x ∈ X(v) belongs to Y (v) if and only if the collection L(x) ∪ E(x) is balanced. For balanced games, Y (v) coincides with the relative interior of the core, and hence is a strict subset of the undominated set. In general, there is no inclusion relation: the condition on Y (v) is weaker in the sense that there is no balancedness condition involving H(x), but stronger in the sense that 
The L 1 -center of a game v was introduced by Spinetto (1974) , who showed that it coincides with the core for balanced games. We will see that it is also closely related to the undominated set. More precisely, it is exactly one of the polytopes of which the undominated set consists.
Definition 5.1 For a game v, let the function : R N → R be defined by
The L 1 -center of the game v is the set
Thus, the L 1 -center consists of all efficient allocations that minimize the sum of the absolute values of the coalitional excesses. Since f is a continuous function and we can restrict ourselves to a bounded and closed subset of X(v) to find its minima, it follows by the extreme value theorem of Weierstraß that the L 1 -center is nonempty; it is also clear that it is closed and therefore compact. By using the triangular inequality for absolute values it is easy to see that the L 1 -center is a convex set. Altogether we have the following result.
Lemma 5.2 Let v be a game. Then L 1 (v) is nonempty, compact and convex.
The next result shows that the L 1 -center coincides with exactly one of the polytopes in Theorem 4.7.
Theorem 5.3 Let v be a game. Then there is a pair (B 1 , B 2 ) ∈ P such that
Proof. We first prove the following two claims.
Claim 1 If x, x ∈ L 1 (v) and S ∈ L(x), then S / ∈ H(x ). To show this, suppose to the contrary that x, x ∈ L 1 (v), S ∈ L(x), and S ∈ H(x ). Let 0 < t < 1 and consider the efficient allocation z = tx
contradicting the fact that z ∈ X(v). This proves Claim 1.
Claim 2 Let x ∈ L 1 (v). If y is a sidepayment with y(S) 0 for all S ∈ E(x), then S∈L(x) y(S) 0 and S∈H(x) y(S) 0.
To show this, let y be a sidepayment with y(S) 0 for all S ∈ E(x). Let ε > 0 be so small that
This implies S∈L(x) y(S) 0 since x ∈ L 1 (v). One similarly shows (x − εy) = (x) + 2ε S∈H(x) y(S) which implies S∈H(x) y(S) 0. This proves Claim 2.
. Letx be a convex combination of all these x S with positive weights. By convexity of the L 1 -center (Lemma 5.2) we havex ∈ L 1 and by Claim 1, L = L(x) and H = H(x).
, we claim that L ∪ E and H ∪ E are balanced. Let y be a sidepayment with y(S) 0 for all S ∈ L ∪ E. By Claim 2 we have S∈H(x) y(S) 0, hence S∈L∪E y(S) 0 (since S∈2 N y(S) = 0), so that y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ L ∪ E. Lemma 2.1 implies that L ∪ E is balanced.
Similarly one shows that
N then S ∈ L and thuŝ x(S) < v(S). If z(S) > v(S) for some S ∈ 2 N then S ∈ H and thusx(S) > v(S). Hence, ifx(S) = v(S) for some S then also z(S) = v(S). Define the sidepayment y by z =x + y, then y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ E. By Claim 2 it follows that
An immediate consequence of Theorems 5.3 and 4.7 and Lemma 5.2 is nonemptiness of the undominated set.
Corollary 5.4 L 1 (v) ⊆ UD(v) and in particular UD(v) = ∅ for every game v.
The following result shows that for three-person games the L 1 -center and the undominated set coincide.
The proof of this theorem is based on an extensive case distinction, and deferred to the appendix of this paper.
For games with more than three players the L 1 -center can be a strict subset of the undominated set. This follows from the fact that the undominated set is not necessarily convex, as was shown by Example 4.6.
Excess Pareto optimal allocations
The L 1 -center of a game v contains the efficient allocations that minimize the sum of the absolute values of the excesses. In this section we further study the relation between these excesses and the undominated set. For a game v, a coalition S ⊆ N , and an allocation x ∈ X(v) we define
Definition 6.1 Let v be a game and x ∈ X(v). Then x is excess Pareto optimal if D(x) = ∅. The set of excess Pareto optimal allocations is denoted by EP (v).
The amount f (S, x) is the total absolute excess of the coalition S and its complement at x. If x ∈ X(v) is excess Pareto optimal, then there is no efficient allocation that has all these amounts lower, and at least one of them strictly lower.
4 Since (x) = 1 2 S⊆N f (S, x), and (x) is minimal exactly on L 1 (v), it follows that L 1 (v) ⊆ EP (v). Below we show that EP (v) is a subset of UD(v), but we start by characterizing EP (v) by balanced collections. For a game v and for x ∈ X(v) we define the following collections of sets:
Clearly, LH(x) ⊆ LEH(x).
The following lemma characterizes excess Pareto optimal allocations in terms of sidepayments.
Lemma 6.2 Let v be a game and let x ∈ X(v). Then x ∈ EP (v) if and only if for every sidepayment y ∈ R N with y(S) 0 for all S ∈ LEH(x) we have y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ LH(x).
Proof. We will use the following claim, the straightforward proof of which is left to the reader.
Claim Let y be a sidepayment. Then there is an ε > 0 with f (x + εy) f (x) if and only if y(S) 0 for all S ∈ LEH(x).
For the only-if direction of the lemma, let x ∈ EP (v) and let y ∈ R N be a sidepayment with y(S) 0 for all S ∈ LEH(x). Then by the Claim there is an ε > 0 such that f (x+εy) f (x). Since x ∈ EP (v) this implies f (x+εy) = f (x). In particular, consider S ∈ LH(x). Then f (S, x + εy) = f (S, x) implies
which in turn implies ε(y(N \ S) − y(S)) = 0, hence ε(−2y(S)) = 0 and thus y(S) = 0.
For the if-direction assume that the sidepayment condition in the lemma holds for x. Let z ∈ X(v) such that f (z) f (x). Then by the Claim the sidepayment y = z − x satisfies y(S) 0 for all S ∈ LEH(x), so that y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ LH(x). Therefore, if S ∈ LH(x), then f (S, z) = f (S, x), and if
, since in those cases f (S, x) is minimal over all efficient allocations. Hence, f (z) = f (x), so that z / ∈ D(x). Since z was arbitrary we conclude that x ∈ EP (v).
Lemmas 2.1 and 6.2 now imply:
Theorem 6.3 Let v be a game and let x ∈ X(v). Then x ∈ EP (v) if and only if LH(x) is balanced within LEH(x).
We will use this characterization of EP (v) to show that it consists of a subset of the finitely many polytopes that constitute UD(v). Define the subset P c of P as follows. A constellation (B 1 , B 2 ) is in P c if the set
Theorem 6.4 Let v be a game. Then
Since B is balanced, this implies x ∈ EP (v) by Theorem 6.3.
Conversely, suppose that x ∈ EP (v). Then by Theorem 6.3 there is a balanced collection B with LH(x) ⊆ B ⊆ LEH(x).
and B 2 are balanced, and v) . This proves the converse inclusion in the theorem.
Theorems 6.4 and 4.7 and our observation following Definition 6.1 imply the following result. Corollary 6.5 and Theorem 5.5 imply that the L 1 -center, the excess Pareto optimal set and the undominated set coincide for three-person games. The next example shows that in general EP (v) can be a proper subset of UD(v).
Example 6.7 Let (N, v) be defined by N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and, for S ⊆ N , v(S) = 1 if S = {1} or |S| = 2, v(N ) = v(∅) = 0, and v(S) = −1 for all other coalitions in N . We claim that x = 0 ∈ R N is an element of UD(v). Indeed, L(x) consists of coalition {1} and all 2-person coalitions; E(x) = {∅, N }; and H(x) consists of all other coalitions. So L(x) and H(x) are balanced and therefore x ∈ UD(v) by Theorem 4.2. However, LH(x) = {1}, which is not balanced within LEH(x) = {∅, 1, N }, so that x / ∈ EP (v) by Theorem 6.3.
Like UD(v) the set EP (v) is not necessarily convex, as the following example shows. This also implies that L 1 (v) can be a proper subset of EP (v). Let x = (0, . . . , 0) and x = (9, 3, −6, −6). As L(x) consists of {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, and {2, 3, 4}, x ∈ EP (v) by Theorem 6.3. Similarly, L(x ) = {12, 134, 234} is balanced so that x ∈ EP (v). Now, let z = x /2. Then L(z) = {12, 234} and E(z) = {∅, N } so that z / ∈ EP (v).
In Section 7 we will show that although EP (v) is not necessarily convex, it is contractible and in particular connected.
We proceed with an interesting class of games for which the undominated set and the excess Pareto optimal set coincide. First, recall that the dual of a game (N, v) is the game (N, v * ), defined by v Further, for games (N, v) and (N, w) denote by (N, v ∧ w) the coalition-wise minimum of v and w, i.e., (v ∧ w)(S) = min{v(S), w(S)} for all S ⊆ N . We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 6.9 For any game v,
Proof. Let v be an arbitrary game and write w = v ∧ v * . It is straightforward to check that for every S ⊆ N we have
The following definition presents weakenings of the familiar superadditivity and subadditivity conditions. Proof. Let v be a game and S an arbitrary coalition.
, then this expression is equal to v(S) + v(N \ S), and otherwise it is equal to 2v(N )−v(S)−v(N \S). In the first case, (v∧v * )(S)+(v∧
Of the second statement we only still have to show the only-if statement, but this follows from (6).
Lemma 6.12 For any game v, EP (v) = UD(v ∧ v * ).
Proof. Let v be an arbitrary game and write w = v ∧ v * . By Lemma 6.9 and Corollary 6.5 it is sufficient to show that UD(w) ⊆ EP (w). Let x ∈ UD(w). By Lemma 6.11, w(S) + w(N \ S) w(N ) for all S ⊆ N . Hence LH(x, w) = L(x, w) and LEH(x, w) = L(x, w)∪E(x, w). Hence LH(x, w) is balanced within LEH(x, w) by Theorem 4.2, and thus x ∈ EP (w) by Theorem 6.3.
It is straightforward to check that both EP and UD are self-dual, i.e., EP (v) = EP (v * ) and UD(v) = UD(v * ).
Corollary 6.13 For any proper or antiproper game v, EP (v) = UD(v).
Proof. If v is proper the corollary follows from Lemmas 6.11 and 6.12. If v is antiproper then v * is proper so that EP (v * ) = UD(v * ) by the same lemmas. Now EP (v) = UD(v) follows by self-duality of EP and UD.
We conclude with the following theorem, which says that any efficient allocation not in EP (v) is excess Pareto dominated by an allocation in EP (v). It shows that in a specific sense EP (v) is the Pareto optimal set of X(v).
Theorem 6.14 Let v be a game and let
for all S ⊆ N . This implies in particular that D(x) is a nonempty polytope. Since the map is continuous we have
7 Contractibility of the set of excess Pareto optimal allocations
We have already seen that for a game v neither the set of excess Pareto optimal allocations EP (v) nor the undominated set UD(v) have to be convex. In this section we show that EP (v) satisfies the weaker condition of contractibility, implying, in particular that it is connected. It follows (cf. Corollary 6.13) that if v is proper or antiproper then also UD(v) is contractible and thus connected. Contractibility or connectedness of UD(v) in general is left as an open problem. For a game v define
Lemma 7.1 Let v be a game. Then T v + is nonempty, closed, and convex.
Proof. Nonemptiness of T v + is obvious, and convexity follows from convexity of the functions f (S, ·). For closedness, let t 1 , t 2 , . .
is compact (Corollary 6.6), we may assume that x 1 , x 2 , . . . converges to some x ∈ EP (v). By continuity of f (·), f (x) t and thus t ∈ T v + .
Recall that a set X ⊆ R m is contractible if there exists a continuous map g : [0, 1] × X → X and a point p ∈ X such that g(0, x) = x and g(1, x) = p for all x ∈ X.
6 Peleg (1972, Theorem 4.6) shows that the set of Pareto optimal elements of any closed convex subset of some Euclidean space is contractible. Clearly, this result also applies with Pareto optimality used in our sense of 'Pareto minimality'. Hence, with Lemma 7.1 we obtain the following result.
Lemma 7.2 For any game v the set T v is contractible.
This implies that f −1 (t) is a convex polytope for each t ∈ T v . Thus, f −1 (·) is a correspondence mapping elements of T v to convex compact subsets of EP (v). We now show that this correspondence is continuous, i.e., upper hemicontinuous (uhc) and lower hemicontinuous (lhc).
Proof. In order to show uhc of f −1 (·), let t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t ∈ T v with t k → t and let
Then by continuity of f , we have f (x) = t, and hence x ∈ f −1 (t). For lhc, let again t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t ∈ T v with t k → t and let z ∈ f −1 (t). We have to show that there are
is minimal: these points z k exist and are unique since f −1 (t k ) is a compact convex set. Since all these points z k are in the compact set EP (v), there is a converging subsequence, say z 1 , z 2 , . . . itself, with limit somez ∈ EP (v). It is sufficient to show thatz = z. Note thatz ∈ f −1 (t) by continuity of f . Since z k →z we may assume without loss of generality that there is a δ > 0 such that for all S ⊆ N we have
We assume thatz = z and derive a contradiction. Since z k →z = z we may assume without loss of generality that
For ε > 0 and each k we define
where the final inequality follows from (9). Hence, by the choice of z k , it follows that z k,ε / ∈ f −1 (t k ) for all k and ε > 0. Choose ε > 0 so small that ε(z(S) − z(S)) < δ for all S ⊆ N . We will now show that then
we distinguish the following four cases (the remaining cases are analogous):
Case (a) S ∈ L(z), N \ S ∈ H(z). In this case, by (7),z(S) = z(S), hence 
Then, by convexity of the set f −1 (t), we have h(α, x) ∈ f −1 (t) for all x ∈ EP (v), t = f (x), and 0 α 1 2 ; and h is continuous, in particular, since g is. Also, h(0, x) = x and h(1, x) =x for all x ∈ EP (v). Thus, EP (v) is contractible.
The min-prenucleolus
An interesting question is whether there exists a single-valued solution for TUgames which always assigns a point in UD(v) or EP (v). An obvious candidate for such a solution is the prenucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) , since this is contained in the core if the core is not empty. It is defined as follows. Recall that for a game (N, v), a coalition S and an allocation x ∈ X(v), e(S, x, v) = v(S) − x(S) denotes the excess of S at x. By θ(x) ∈ R 2 |N | −2 we denote the vector in which the excesses of all nonempty proper coalitions in N are arranged in nonincreasing order. The prenucleolus of (N, v) is the efficient allocation, denoted ν(N, v) = ν(v), which lexicographically minimizes θ(x) over all x ∈ X(v).
The following example, however, shows that even in three-player games, where the undominated set, the excess Pareto optimal set, and the L 1 -center coincide, the prenucleolus does not have to be in the undominated set. We now propose a modification of the prenucleolus and prove that this solution always assigns a point in EP (v) and hence in UD(v).
If the game v is proper then by Lemma 6.11 the min-prenucleolus of v is just the prenucleolus of v. The game in Example 8.1 is not proper, and as the following example shows its min-prenucleolus is in the undominated set. Proof. Let w = v ∧ v * and x = ν(w). By Lemma 6.9 it is sufficient to show that x ∈ EP (w). As (x, w) . By the characterization of the prenucleolus by Kohlberg (1971) , {N } ∪ L(x, w) is balanced so that the proof is complete by Theorem 6.3.
The min-prenucleolus does not have to be in the L 1 -center, as the following example shows. We present an axiomatization of the min-prenucleolus based on a reduced game property, among other axioms. To this end we make the set of players variable. The universe of potential players is U ⊆ N, with {1, 2, 3, 4} ⊆ U . A game is now any pair (N, v) such that ∅ = N ⊆ U is finite and v : 2 N → R, v(∅) = 0. The set of all games is denoted by Γ U .
Let σ be a solution, i.e.,
, where x S := (x i ) i∈S and where the reduced game (S, v S,x ) is defined by
Remark 8. 6 Sobolev (1975) showed that the prenucleolus is the unique solution that satisfies SIVA, COV, AN and RGP, provided that |U | = ∞.
Our solution ν ∧ satisfies all of the foregoing properties except RGP. We weaken this property, as follows. A solution σ satisfies (viii) the min-reduced game property (min-RGP) if, for (N, v) ∈ Γ U , ∅ = S ⊆ N , and
Moreover, we need the following property, which is stronger than SD. A solution σ satisfies
Observe that, indeed, min-SD implies SD: for a game v, we have
Theorem 8.7 The solution ν ∧ is the unique solution that satisfies SIVA, COV, AN, min-RGP, and min-SD, provided that |U | = ∞.
Hence ν ∧ satisfies SIVA, COV, and AN because ν satisfies these properties (see Remark 8.6), and it satisfies min-SD because w ∧ w * = w. In order to show that ν ∧ satisfies min-RGP, let x = ν(N, w) and ∅ = S ⊆ N such that u = u ∧ u * , where u = v S,x . Since the prenucleolus satisfies RGP, it suffices to show that u = w S,x . As w v, we have w
Thus,
In order to show uniqueness, let σ be a solution that satisfies the five axioms. We show first that σ satisfies PO. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ U and x = σ(N, v). If |N | = 1, i.e., N = {i} for some i ∈ U , then x i v({i}). By COV we may assume v({i}) = 0. If we had x i < 0, then 2x i = x i whereas v = 2v, so that COV is violated. Hence, x i = 0. If |N | 2, then for any i ∈ N , ({i}, v {i},x ) coincides with its dual so that, by min-RGP,
Now we are able to finish the proof. Let (N, v) ∈ Γ U and x = ν ∧ (N, v). In order to show that x = σ(N, v), by min-SD and COV we may assume that v = v ∧ v * and x = 0 ∈ R N . Hence, in particular, 0 = ν(N, v). According to Sobolev (1975) there exists a game (M, u) ∈ Γ U with the following properties: (1) N ⊆ M ; (2) u(N ) = 0; (3) for all i, j ∈ M there exists a permutation τ : M → M such that τ u = u and τ (i) = j; and (4) with y = 0 ∈ R M , u N,y = v. Then, by PO and AN, σ(M, u) = y. By min-RGP, y S = 0 = x = σ(N, v).
We conclude this section with a few remarks.
Remark 8.8 A careful inspection of Sobolev's (1975) proof shows that the game (M, u) in the proof of Theorem 8.7 is proper. Hence, on the set of proper games the prenucleolus is characterized by SIVA, COV, AN, and min-RGP, provided that |U | = ∞. This suggests that a characterization of the prenucleolus on other classes of games may be obtained by modifying the axioms in an appropriate way. In particular, RGP should be restricted to hold for those reduced games that are in the class of games under consideration.
Remark 8.9 We show that each of the axioms in Theorem 8.7 is logically independent of the remaining axioms. Define, for any (N, v) ∈ Γ U , σ 1 (N, v) = X(N, v), σ 2 (N, v) = x to be the "equal split solution", i.e., where t + = max{0, t} for t ∈ R and ν = ν(N, v), is called the positive core of (N, v) (see Orshan and Sudhölter, 2010) . Select a total order on U and define σ 3 (N, v) = {x ∈ C + (N, v ∧ v * ) | x lex y for all y ∈ C(N, v ∧ v * )}, where lex is the lexicographic order induced by , i.e., if x, y ∈ R N , then x lex y is defined by i ∈ N, y i > x i =⇒ there exists j ∈ N with x j > y j and j i.
Similarly to Lemma 6.3.15 of Peleg and Sudhölter (2007) it may be shown that σ 3 satisfies SIVA, COV, min-RGP, min-SD, and violates AN. Finally, if 4 |U | < ∞ then there exists a solution that satisfies all five axioms, coincides with ν ∧ (N, v) for all (N, v) ∈ Γ U with |N | < |U |, and does not coincide with ν ∧ (U, w) for some (U, w) ∈ Γ U . For a construction of such a solution see Peleg and Sudhölter (2007, Remark 6.3 .3 and Exercises 6.2.3 and 6.3.3).
Remark 8. 10 Yanovskaya (1999) proposes the absolute prenucleolus, which is defined as the prenucleolus but then replacing the excesses by their absolute values. Consider the three-person game v with v(N ) = v(123) = 0, v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(23) = −1, and v(12) = v(13) = 1. For this (proper) game the absolute prenucleolus is x = (0, 0, 0), which however does not belong to UD(v): L(x) = {12, 13} and E(x) = {∅, N }, so that L(x) is not balanced within L(x) ∪ E(x). So the absolute prenucleolus does not select from UD nor from EP .
Proper games
We have seen that on the interesting class of proper games some of the concepts above simplify. In particular, the undominated set and the excess Pareto optimal set coincide, and the min-prenucleolus is by definition just the prenucleolus, and chooses an allocation from the undominated set.
In this section we reconsider the definition of the undominated set from Section 3, and show that it can be simplified in an appealing manner if we restrict attention to proper games. For a game v call an allocation x ∈ X(v) payoff-undominated if there is no z ∈ X(v) such that min{z(S), v(S)} min{x(S), v(S)} for all S ∈ 2 N , with at least one strict inequality. Let U (v) denote the set of all payoffundominated allocations. It is not difficult to see that x ∈ U (v) if and only if there is no z ∈ X(v) with z(S) x(S) for all S ∈ L(x), at least one inequality strict, and z(S) v(S) for all S ∈ E(x) ∪ H(x). In other words, it is not possible to make all coalitions that receive less than their worth in x at least as well off and some strictly better off, while giving all other coalitions still at least their worth. From the proof of Theorem 4.2 it follows that x ∈ U (v) if and only if L(x) is balanced within L(x) ∪ E(x). Obviously, UD(v) ⊆ U (v) for any game v. For proper games the two sets coincide.
Theorem 9.1 Let v be a proper game. Then U (v) = UD(v).
Proof. Let x ∈ U (v). It is sufficient to prove that x ∈ UD(v) and for this it is sufficient to prove that H(x) is balanced within H(x) ∪ E(x). We will actually prove that H(x) ∪ E(x) is balanced. Let B be a balanced collection with L(x) ⊆ B ⊆ L(x) ∪ E(x) and let y be a sidepayment with y(S) 0 for all S ∈ H(x) ∪ E(x). Then for each S ∈ B we have y(S) 0 since N \ S ∈ H(x) ∪ E(x) by properness of v. Since B is balanced, y(S) = 0 for all S ∈ B by Lemma 2.1. Since B ∪ H(x) ∪ E(x) = 2 N we have y(S) 0 for all coalitions S, implying y = 0. Hence, H(x) ∪ E(x) is balanced by Lemma 2.1.
Concluding remarks
This paper presents an extensive study of four increasing set extensions of the core and the anticore: the L 1 -center, the excess Pareto optimal set, the undominated set, and the set of payoff-undominated allocations. It also presents a single-valued selection from the excess Pareto optimal set, namely the minprenucleolus.
We have focussed on geometric properties of these sets and on balancedness conditions. An interesting avenue for further research is to develop axiomatic characterizations, perhaps by using reduced game properties such as in the characterization of the core by Peleg (1986) .
We finally mention that many of our results will go through, with appropriate modifications, if the set of all coalitions 2 N is replaced by a balanced collection B containing the empty set and the grand coalition.
